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SÉANCES, CIÉNEGAS, AND SLOP: CAN
COLLABORATION SAVE THE DELTA?
Bret C. Birdsong*
Issues of transboundary allocation of water resources and its environmental effects are, virtually by their very nature, ones that require collaborative
solutions. In the absence of international law norms and institutions to resolve
sovereign claims to the waters of international rivers, much of the decisionmaking is left to the collaborative, or negotiated, arrangements between the countries involved and their respective domestic stakeholders. This Article
examines collaborative efforts to allocate waters in the Colorado River basin as
they relate to the lowest reaches of that great river, the ecologically important
but very fragile Colorado River Delta in Mexico. Collaboration1 is sometimes
promoted as preferable to environmental decisionmaking through formal legalistic mechanisms and institutions. Its purported advantages include the flexibility to include stakeholders who might be disempowered in a formal legal
context, the ability to develop a widely agreed upon information basis for
resolving factually complex questions, and the potential for elevating shared
values over contested ones.2 This review does not seek to contest any of those
points, but it does sound a cautionary note—namely, that solutions reached by
collaborative processes are not necessarily beneficial for the environment or for
those constituencies that promote or benefit from its protection. Collaboration
alone, without structuring the legal and economic framework for policymaking
to provide specifically for the goal of protecting the delta, is unlikely to move
much water downstream to where it’s needed to save the imperiled delta.
The Article unfolds in two main parts. After a brief introduction to the
ecological perils facing the Colorado River Delta in Part I, it will recount in
Part II past experience, both distant and recent, of collaborative efforts to allocate the river among its sovereign interests and their constituents. These stories
demonstrate that decisions forged by collaboration have contributed to the
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
1 A word or two is warranted at the outset about my use of the term “collaboration.”
Throughout this Article, I use the word broadly to mean processes in which policy and
resource allocation decisions are made through bargaining between interested entities,
whether governmental, private, or nonprofit. Collaboration in this perspective stands in contrast to formal decisionmaking processes such as adjudication or informal rulemaking, in
which procedures are set forth by applicable law. Collaboration, in this sense, is not meant
to embrace any particular method or form of decisionmaking by bargaining.
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental
Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 320 (1980) (“By limiting the access of
interested parties, restricting the information available for consideration, restricting the range
of concerns to legally recognizable causes of action, and ‘segmenting’ complex and interrelated problems into discrete legal actions, the courts make it practically impossible to reach a
judgment that acknowledges the real concerns of all interested parties.”).
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delta’s decline and missed opportunities to restore it. These decisions include
the Colorado River Compact, the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Treaty, and the Lower
Colorado Multispecies Conservation Plan. In addition, collaborative decisions
in the works, including the lining of the All-American Canal, and the Drop-2
Dam, by focusing on reducing “slop,” further threaten to harm the delta and its
prospects for restoration. In sum, there is no shortage of “collaboration” going
on up and down the river that directly affects the interests of the delta. The
problem, in my view, is that the collaborations are yielding decisions that
merely reflect the priorities of entrenched economic interests and legal
frameworks that value those economic interests. If collaborations are to solve
the problem of the delta, then they must be structured in some way to give
ecological interests a voice that has heretofore largely been silenced by a combination of exclusion from the collaborative process and exclusion from the
legal framework in which the collaborative processes take place.
Part III of this Article will examine the future possibilities that collaboration can find a way to bring the delta back from moribundity. Whatever the
contribution of recent and far past Colorado River collaborative arrangements
to the delta’s present plight, it seems clear that any future recovery of the delta
will depend on one or more collaborative solutions. Even if domestic law
within the United States or Mexico provided for some enforceable legal mandate to provide water to the delta, the present law of the river, combined with
the lack of physical storage capabilities in Mexico, makes the problem inescapably international in scope. Part III argues that the best chance for a successful
collaboration to provide for the ecological needs of the delta would be the
extension to Mexico of the concept of Intentionally Created Surplus (“ICS”), an
innovation recently agreed upon by the seven basin states within the United
States.3
I. BIG PROBLEMS, SMALL PROBLEMS,

AND THE

BASIS

FOR

HOPE

The Colorado River Delta, before the construction of the great dams of the
Colorado River, was a vast and productive desert estuary. Created by a silt
laden and highly variable river, it stretched out over some 3000 square miles.
The river cut numerous, shifting channels through the unstable lands that had
been deposited by the river and were continually flushed by unusually large
tidal flows in the Gulf of California. Recounting a canoe trip to the delta in
1922, Aldo Leopold noted: “On the map the Delta was bisected by the river,
but in fact the river was nowhere and everywhere, for he could not decide
which of a hundred green lagoons offered the most pleasant and least speedy
path to the Gulf.”4
Beginning with the completion of Hoover Dam in 1935, the Colorado
River was transformed into an almost fully controlled water delivery system
supplying water to more than thirty million people and irrigating more than 3.5
million acres of cropland in the U.S. and Mexico. For six years during the
3 ICS is described in helpful detail by Professor Grant in a separate article in this Symposium. See Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages:
The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964 (2008).
4 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 150 (1949).
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filling of Lake Mead behind Hoover Dam and for nearly twenty years during
the filling of Lake Powell behind Glen Canyon Dam, the delta received almost
no freshwater flows. River flows into the delta today are scarcely a quarter of
their average at the turn of the twentieth century. The shifting silt flats of the
delta have been reduced to a tiny fragment of their historic size and are now
surrounded by nearly half a million acres of irrigated farmland. Expansive wetlands covering as much as 1.8 million acres were reduced to as few as 40,000
acres.5
Yet despite its precipitous crash, proclamations of the delta’s death were
premature. The El Niño years of the early 1980s brought freshwater back to
the delta when the great dams of the Colorado proved insufficient to store massive spring runoff from melting snowpacks for short periods. The El Niño of
the mid-1990s offered an encore performance. To the surprise of many, the
delta ecosystem responded with resilience. Its riparian habitat grew to more
than 150,000 acres,6 still just a remnant of its pre-dams glory, but more than is
found on the Colorado River between the Grand Canyon and the Mexican border.7 And despite its much reduced size, the delta offers impressive ecological
values. More than 350 bird species use habitat in the area, as do several endangered species, including the Yuma clapper rail, the southwestern willow flycatcher, and the precarious vaquita porpoise.8
Given the scale of the water deprivation and the severity of the impacts—
the delta today is only ten percent of its pre-development size—one might think
that restoration would be an impossibility because the water required could
never be wrested from users who have come to depend on it. But recent studies
suggest that water supply requirements of restoration are modest. Environmental advocates suggest that annual flows of about 32,000 acre-feet and pulse
flows of 260,000 acre-feet every four years on average would restore and protect substantial ecological functioning and habitat in the delta.9 Providing for
this flow regime would require less than one percent of the river’s flow.10
There is certainly hope in the modesty of these restoration requirements,
but there is presently no water dedicated to the delta for habitat maintenance
and restoration. Rather, in light of recent climate change and long-term climate
research, it appears that the Colorado River is approaching full appropriation, if
it has not already surpassed it.

5 See Robert Jerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and Why the
Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 906
(2002).
6 Id. at 907.
7 Id.
8 FRANCISCO ZAMORA-ARROYO ET AL., CONSERVATION PRIORITIES IN THE COLORADO RIVER
DELTA: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (2005), available at http://sonoran.org/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=157&Itemid=27.
9 DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND WETLAND
HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 32 (1999), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/425_delta.pdf.
10 Id.
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II. COLLABORATION STORIES: THE COLORADO RIVER COLLABORATIONS
AND THE PLIGHT OF THE DELTA
In considering the role of collaborative solutions and the future of the Colorado River Delta, it is instructive to engage first in an exercise of forensics.
How the delta got to its present precarious state is a story in which collaboration plays a leading role. The initial development of the domestic law of the
river, and later, the series of binational agreements between the U.S. and Mexico, demonstrate how collaborations between the sovereign powers on behalf of
their represented resource users left the delta with insufficient water to maintain
its ecological functions.
A. The Framework Collaborations
1. The Colorado River Compact of 1922
The story of collaboration on the Colorado begins, as do many of the ecological tragedies of western water law, with the foundational tenets of modern
water law. First is the rule that the prior “beneficial use” of water will be
protected against interference by later appropriators. Second is the consequential corollary of the notion of “beneficial use” on arid lands: Water not put to
beneficial use—say, because it is left in the channel to flow to the sea (or
across the border)—is “wasted.” These notions, well ensconced in western
water law and lore by the late nineteenth century, formed the impetus and the
backdrop for the Colorado River Compact in 1922.
As in many river basins, water resources development in the lower Colorado River basin preceded upper basin development. Shortly after the turn of
the twentieth century, a new canal brought Colorado River water, after dipping
into Mexico, to farms in the Imperial Valley in California. Severe flooding and
ongoing disagreements with Mexico over the use and maintenance of the canal
spurred Imperial Valley farmers to demand an All-American Canal and a large
dam and storage reservoir (Hoover Dam and Lake Mead) on the Colorado
River, to be federally funded and operated. The upstream states were understandably fearful that such a project would spawn already-burgeoning California to use even more Colorado River water before it could be put to beneficial
use upstream, possibly foreclosing later upstream development and growth.
The upstream states’ opposition ripened into intransigence when the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Colorado 11 indicated that allocation of the Colorado River among the states would be governed by a “first in time, first in
right” rule.12
In the intersection of lower basin demands and upper basin insecurities
was born the first great collaboration on the Colorado River. The Colorado
River Compact13 famously divided the Colorado River into two sub-basins and
11

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (holding that the doctrine of prior appropriation would apply to disputes between states sharing a source of water if the party states
recognized the doctrine).
12 NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY
212-13 (rev. ed. 2001).
13 Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
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apportioned both the upper basin states and lower basin states the “exclusive
beneficial consumptive use” of 7.5 million acre-feet (“maf”) per year.14 In
addition, the Colorado River Compact grants the lower basin states the “beneficial consumptive use” of one maf.15 Thus, while requiring the upper basin
states to deliver to the lower basin, at Lee Ferry, a total of seventy-five maf
over any ten year period,16 the Colorado River Compact effectively protected
future upper basin development up to 7.5 maf per year.
As concerns the Colorado River Delta, there are three notable aspects of
the Colorado River Compact. First, the Compact gave scant attention to Mexico, including preexisting agricultural development south of the border. The
Compact did allow, “as a matter of international comity,” that the U.S. might
later recognize Mexican water rights, and it provided that any such entitlement
would be satisfied first from river flow in excess of the sixteen maf apportioned
between the upper and lower basins and, in the event of shortage, that the deficiency be borne equally by the two basins.17 Although the negotiators had
discussed whether to quantify Mexico’s share of the river, the State Department
had urged them not to, asserting that the U.S. had the legal right to use the
entire river within its border while acknowledging precedent for resolving
water disputes with Mexico with an eye toward international comity.18
Second, the Colorado River Compact embraced the view, prevalent at the
time, that states could demand Colorado River water only for utilitarian purposes, not for environmental use either instream or out of channel. This came
in the form of a prohibition against the upper basin withholding and the lower
basin requiring delivery of water “which can not reasonably be applied to
domestic and agricultural uses.”19
The third important aspect regarding the delta is the faulty and overly optimistic understanding of Colorado River streamflow on which the Compact’s
apportionment was based, and it is this aspect that places the first two in
sharper focus. The negotiators considered streamflow data from 1905 to 1922
and accepted a mean annual flow at Yuma, Arizona, of 16.4 maf.20 It is now
known from stream gage data that the period from 1905 to 1922 demonstrated
the highest long-term annual flow volume in the twentieth century.21 Moreover, tree ring studies analyzing several hundred years of data confirm that the
early years of the twentieth century were among the wettest in history.22
14

Id. art. III(a). Hereafter, million acre-feet will be maf. An acre-foot of water is the
amount of water that covers an acre to the depth of one foot, or approximately 326,000
gallons.
15 Id. art. III(b).
16 Id. art. III(d).
17 Id. art. III(c). The Compact did not indicate the manner of determining whether any
deficiency exists or specify the manner of delivery of the upper basin’s share of any deficiency to satisfy Mexico’s claim.
18 See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 51 (1966).
19 Colorado River Compact art. III(e).
20 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 97 (2007).
21 Id. The mean annual flow during the 1905-1922 period was 16.1 maf at Lee Ferry.
Stream gage data from 1905-2006 indicate a mean annual flow of roughly 15 maf. Id. at 94.
22 Id. at 99, 103.
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Indeed, multiple tree ring studies indicate that periods of extended drought are
integral to the Colorado River basin and that the natural variability of the system is considerably greater, particularly with respect to drought, than reflected
in the stream gage data.23 In short, the river’s bounty, whether it be allocated
entirely among the states, or shared with Mexico and environmental systems, is
almost certainly less than was believed by the original collaborators.24
2. The U.S.-Mexico Treaty of 1944
As envisioned by the Colorado River Compact, the U.S. and Mexico eventually entered into a treaty to recognize Mexico’s right to Colorado River
water. Like the earlier Compact, the 1944 treaty between the United States of
America and Mexico on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande25 reflects the utilitarian legal norms prevailing at
the time and unrealistic expectations of the river’s flow. The second great collaboration on the Colorado River thus, like the first, helped to cement a law of
the river that would choke the delta of its water.
The treaty, as adopted, provided for the guaranteed delivery of 1.5 maf
annually to Mexico at the international border. In the event of a surplus of flow
beyond that necessary to supply U.S. uses and the guaranteed 1.5 maf—the
determination of which is given to the U.S.—the treaty provides that the U.S.
will “undertake” to deliver an additional 200,000 acre-feet.26 The treaty also
provides for the possibility of shortage, but not without considerable ambiguity.
In the event of an “extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation
system in the United States,” which makes it “difficult” for the U.S. to meet its
obligation to Mexico, the Mexican allotment “will be reduced in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States are reduced.”27 The treaty
does not address what amounts to an “extraordinary drought” or “difficulty,”
who is responsible for making those determinations, or the manner of the proportional reduction of use.28
Negotiations over Mexico’s share of the Colorado began shortly after the
Compact. The talks initially focused on the amounts needed to provide for
existing, and eventually expanded to include consideration of future, uses. In
1929, the United States offered what it considered a “just and generous”
750,000 acre-feet for Mexican lands, based solely on the amount delivered for
23

Id. at 110.
It would be unfair, of course, to blame the compact negotiators for what they could not
know. In the early twentieth century, the science of dendroclimatology had not yet been
developed and the stream gage data was incomplete. But there is some unsettling evidence
that the Colorado River Commission’s negotiators knew their data was not waterproof. Id.
at 97 (“Transcripts of Colorado River Compact negotiations describe occasions when Colorado River Commission representatives expressed concern about potentially overly optimistic estimates of annual flow . . . , perhaps in recognition of some of the low flows prior to
1905 [which had been excluded].”).
25 Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219.
26 Id. art. 10(b).
27 Id.
28 For an extensive discussion of these ambiguities, see Charles J. Meyers & Richard L.
Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367, 411-15 (1967).
24
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irrigation and domestic use in Mexico in 1928.29 Mexico flatly rejected the
proposal, insisting on 3.6 maf, and negotiations stalled for a decade.30 What
eventually broke the impasse was the expression of willingness on the part of
the U.S. to swap Colorado River water for Rio Grande water, but this willingness, too, was predicated on the understanding that existing uses claimed by
Mexico on the Colorado could be offset by existing uses in the U.S. satisfied by
Mexican delivery of water on the Rio Grande. Mexico pressed the U.S. to
consider existing and future Mexican uses of Colorado River water, but it still
tied its demands to utilitarian notions of water usage.31 Thus, the value of the
delta’s ecological systems played no role in consideration of the amount of
water allocated to Mexico.
Any sense on behalf of the U.S. that its offer of 750,000 acre-feet was
“just and generous” was supported by the doctrine of international law known
as the “Harmon Doctrine.” The Harmon Doctrine held that an upstream nation
may exercise complete control over the waters within its territorial boundaries
incident to its “absolute sovereignty . . . as against all others, within its own
territory.”32 Under the doctrine, the U.S. could claim the right to the entire
flow of the Colorado River with no obligation to Mexico. Although the U.S.
negotiators demurred from asserting the Harmon Doctrine directly in negotiations with Mexico,33 representatives of the Colorado River states empanelled to
advise U.S. treaty negotiators enthusiastically embraced the doctrine and
accepted any concession to Mexico, even for existing uses, only as a practical
necessity beyond the requirements of law.34
By the time the treaty was forged in 1944, it had become apparent that the
river flow data from 1905 to 1922 on which the Colorado River Compact was
based gave an unrealistic picture of the amount of available water.35 Additional stream gages and the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930s revealed that the
river would produce less water than earlier assumed over significant periods of
time.36 Yet both parties still believed that the river produced more water than
later records and studies would reveal. To the extent, then, that the final agreement envisioned meeting the obligation to Mexico in most years without reduction of U.S. uses, and that Mexico could put that water to beneficial use, there
would be little flow left for the delta.37

29

Id. at 368.
Id. at 368-69.
31 Id. at 369-70.
32 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 274, 281 (1895). The doctrine is named
for the Attorney General who had issued the opinion in a dispute with Mexico over U.S.
diversions of the Rio Grande.
33 See Meyers & Noble, supra note 28, at 370.
34 Id. at 381-82.
35 Id. at 377, 379.
36 Id. at 380.
37 Of course, this is largely the legacy of the 1922 Compact, which envisioned the eventual
consumptive use of sixteen maf, and guaranteed an average of only 7.5 maf of flow past Lee
Ferry.
30
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3. The Salinity Agreement and the Ciénega de Santa Clara38
The salinity of the Colorado River in its lower reaches has long posed a
problem for agricultural and municipal water users and for Mexico in particular.39 Water applied to irrigated lands seeps into the soil, absorbing salt and
other minerals from the soil, and then returns to the river via groundwater and
drains. In as heavily a utilized system as the Colorado River, water becomes
more saline as it moves downstream because it is applied to the land many
times over. By the time it reaches the lowest reaches within the United States,
it carries more than twice the salt that would naturally occur in the river, at a
substantial cost to U.S. and Mexican water users whose agricultural yields
decline or who must shift production to lower value salt tolerant crops.40
The salinity issue became an international crisis in 1961 when the
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District (“WMIDD”) completed a
drainage canal and began discharging extremely saline agricultural wastewater
into the Colorado River near Yuma, Arizona.41 This spiked the salinity level of
the water delivered to Mexico and diverted at Morelos Dam.42 The consequences for Mexican agriculture were dire, including crop loss on some
100,000 acres.43 Over time, the situation only grew worse, as the application
of saline water to Mexican lands created alkaline soils unsuitable for agricultural production.
American officials met Mexico’s protest of outrage with a cool assertion
that the Harmon Doctrine and the 1944 treaty did not require the U.S. to maintain any particular water quality at the point of delivery to Mexico.44 Even
against this territorialist legal backdrop, however, the U.S. began working with
Mexico on both physical and legal fixes to the salinity problem. First, as a
stopgap measure, the U.S. constructed a bypass channel to enable Mexico to
elect for WMIDD drainage water to enter the river below Mexican diversion at
Morelos Dam. The bypass allowed saline water unfit for irrigation to flow to
the delta without harming agricultural interests. Then, in 1973, the countries
entered into an amendment to the 1944 treaty (Minute 242) requiring the U.S.
to deliver treaty water to Mexico essentially equal in quality to that diverted at
Imperial Dam into the All-American Canal and to U.S. users in the limitrophe
section of the river.45
The extraordinary measures the U.S. has taken to comply with its obligations under Minute 242 have led to a new conundrum for the delta. The conun38

“Ciénega” is a Spanish term meaning marsh.
For an excellent overview of the salinity issues in the lower Colorado River, see ROBERT
W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY
214-23 (2007).
40 Id. at 215-16.
41 Id. at 216.
42 HUNDLEY, supra note 18, at 173.
43 Id. at 175.
44 Id.; ADLER, supra note 39, at 217. The U.S. maintained that the treaty’s reference to
water from “any and all sources” envisioned the delivery of irrigation return flow and
negated Mexico’s claim to good quality water.
45 Minute 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., Aug.
30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968.
39
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drum is the Ciénega de Santa Clara, a remnant wetland near the Gulf of
California that has grown to nearly 40,000 acres as a result of saline drainage
discharged from WMIDD. The Ciénega has become the largest and one of the
most important perennial wetlands in the delta. As the possibility of shortage
looms ever greater, however, so does the probability that the Ciénega de Santa
Clara will lose its main source of water. In addition to implementing a basinwide program to reduce salt inputs to the river from agriculture, the U.S.
authorized the construction of the Yuma Desalination Plant (“YDP”) to treat
WMIDD water so that it can be used to fulfill the Mexican entitlement of 1.5
maf.46 For a variety of reasons, however, the YDP has never become operational, except for short periods of testing. Instead, WMIDD wastewater that
would otherwise be treated by the YDP has been diverted into the Main Outlet
Drain Extension (“MODE”) canal. In order to bypass the Colorado River, the
MODE canal delivers more than 100,000 acre-feet of water per year to the
Ciénega de Santa Clara in Mexico. Increasing risk of shortage in the Colorado
River, combined with increased usage and efficiency of system water, makes it
likely that the YDP will soon be brought back online, greatly reducing flows to
the Ciénega.
The Ciénega de Santa Clara is a bit of a ghost of Christmas future. It is a
story of an ecologically valuable wetland, which owes its viability to mistakes
of past while still bearing the risk that the mistakes will be cured. Though it is
itself a legacy of collaboration, its precarious future rests in the hands of future
collaborators. Indeed, a recent collaborative effort convened by the director of
the Central Arizona Project has worked to explore ways to protect the interests
of Arizona irrigators while also preserving the viability of the Ciénega de Santa
Clara.47
B. The Lower Colorado Multispecies Conservation Plan: The
Collaboration That Got Away
One of the supposed benefits of collaborative decisionmaking processes is
that they can provide an opportunity to fold issues into the mix that would not
be taken into consideration in formal, legalistic decisonmaking processes. One
of the largest and most significant collaborative efforts on the Colorado River
system—the Lower Colorado Multispecies Habitat Conservation Plan—represents something of a missed opportunity to rectify this hope for the benefit of
the delta.
The Colorado River from Lake Mead and Hoover Dam to the delta is
almost wholly a manipulated river. Absent extraordinary floods, the series of
dams operated in the U.S. by the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) determines
how much water flows in the river, and the series of diversions for domestic
and agricultural uses determines how much water stays in the river. Under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”),48 however, federal agencies must ensure, in
46

ADLER, supra note 39, at 218.
See BALANCING WATER NEEDS ON THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER: RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE YUMA DESALTING PLANT/CIENEGA DE SANTA CLARA WORKGROUP (2005), available
at http://ag.arizona.edu/AZWATER/publications/YDP%20report%20042205.pdf.
48 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
47
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consultation with the appropriate wildlife agency (either the Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)), that
their activities will not jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or
endangered species.49 The ESA also prohibits any entity—private or governmental—from causing the “take” of an endangered species50 unless authorized
by an “incidental take permit” issued by the Secretary of the Interior upon
submission of a habitat conservation plan.51
In view of its responsibilities under sections 7 and 9 of the ESA as well as
other river stakeholders’ obligations under section 9, the Bureau decided in the
mid-1990s to convene a large multiparty collaboration to formulate a Multispecies Conservation Plan for the Lower Colorado River (“LCRMSCP”).52 In a
narrow legal sense, the LCRMSCP aimed to develop a plan for river management in the lower Colorado River that would avoid jeopardy to any species as
required by section 7 and, by operation of a permit issued under section 10,
protect Colorado River users from liability for any incidental takes of species
that would otherwise violate section 9. But its aims were actually more ambitious and extended beyond navigating the near-term perils of the ESA. By
incorporating a broad array of interests—federal agencies, states, irrigation districts, power generators, and environmentalists—it sought, in a sense, to bring
peace to the valley by forging an agreed upon operational scheme for the
manipulated river. Further, by establishing a habitat conservation framework
for the next fifty years—with a concomitant promise that nothing more onerous
would be required of the participants during that time—it sought to create certainty in the face of the uncertain future of the species that depend on the river
for habitat. So, though perhaps motivated by the strict legal framework of the
ESA, the LCRMSCP potentially offered something more than mere regulatory
compliance.
At the beginning of the collaborative process, the Bureau invited national
environmental groups—notably Defenders of Wildlife—to join the steering
committee of the LCRMSCP.53 On the steering committee, Defenders and
others advocated that the scope of the collaboration should include consideration of habitat for endangered species in Mexico. If the collaboration was to
yield any substantial improvement to the operation of the river, the environmental interests urged, then it should consider the Mexican habitat that had
suffered the greatest harm and whose restoration would provide the greatest
49

Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
Endangered Species Act § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). The ESA defines “take” broadly as
“to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Regulations interpreting the word
“harm” in the statute extend the definition to include any act that actually kills or injures
protected wildlife, including significant modification or destruction of habitat “significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (2007). See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding the regulatory interpretation of “harm”).
51 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
52 The final plan adopted by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation can be found at 2 LOWER
COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, FINAL HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLAN (2004), available at www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/VolumeII.pdf.
53 Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 61 (D.D.C. 2003).
50
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benefit. Indeed, given the extensive development of the floodplain in the
United States, it seems likely that habitat restoration efforts in Mexico would
yield greater “bang for the buck” than restoration efforts north of the border. In
addition, even if U.S. environmental laws like the ESA do not apply extraterritorially,54 strong arguments support the view that the ESA and the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) require agencies to consider the transboundary effects of actions taken within the U.S., such as management of the
facilities on the lower Colorado River, particularly when those effects are on
endangered species that migrate across the border.55
When other steering committee participants objected and the Bureau
decided not to consider Mexican species and habitat as part of the LCRMSCP,
the environmental groups quit the collaborative process and opted for the
courts.56 Their lawsuit alleged that the Bureau’s failure to consider Mexican
species and habitat violated its obligations under the ESA. Without considering
the contention that the ESA requires consideration of transboundary effects and
habitat, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau
because it lacked discretion to provide more water for habitat restoration in the
delta.57 Defenders of Wildlife did not appeal.
The story of the LCRMSCP might fairly be called the collaboration that
got away. Even if the formal legal structure of the ESA did not compel consideration of Mexican species and habitat, it is not at all clear that it prohibited it.
At the beginning of the ESA consultation process, FWS directed the Bureau to
assess the impacts of its lower Colorado River operations on Mexican populations of the southwestern willow flycatcher and the Yuma clapper rail and to
consult NMFS formally regarding impacts to the totoaba bass and the vaquita
harbor porpoise, two species in the delta and upper Gulf of California.58 The
Bureau complied, finding that the totoaba bass and the southwestern willow
flycatcher might be affected by its discretionary activities but also that the other
species would be affected only by its nondiscretionary actions.59 Aside from
the past practice, the Council on Environmental Quality has issued guidance
urging the consideration of transboundary impacts under NEPA, noting its consistency with the international law norm that a nation may not undertake
actions in its territory that will harm another nation.60 Further, even if the
impacts on such species cannot be addressed by actions within the discretion of
federal agencies, the information provided about the nature of the impacts can
54

This is an issue, however, that remains unresolved. See ADLER, supra note 39, at 224.
See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also
Glennon & Culp, supra note 5, at 959.
56 Defenders of Wildlife, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
57 Id. at 69 (accepting the Bureau’s contention that “it cannot interpret the Law of the River
in a way that will divert or somehow ‘indirectly result’ in excess flows to Mexico”).
58 Id. at 59.
59 Id. at 59-60. The importance of the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction is that
courts have held section 7 inapplicable to nondiscretionary actions by federal agencies. See
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). If an agency is required by law
to take some action and has no discretion to refrain from taking that action, then the ESA
imposes no obligation under section 7.
60 Council on Environmental Quality Guidance on NEPA Analyses for Transboundary
Impacts (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/transguide.html.
55
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inform choices about actions in Mexico that may aid those species or changes
in national or binational law to address the impacts.
In sum, the result of the LCRMSCP collaboration, shaped by a U.S. legal
context that accords no value to Mexican habitat, was, if not bad for the delta,
at least not a positive step toward restoration. In terms of the propounded benefits of collaborative management, it was a missed opportunity to leverage the
flexibility of a collaborative decisionmaking process to address the concerns of
significant stakeholders.
C. The Collaborations That Might Further Drain the Delta: The
Campaign Against Slop
Much of the water that reaches the delta does so by accident. For the most
part, it is water that cannot be captured for storage and delivery for consumptive uses in the U.S. or Mexico. It is water that, because of operational inefficiencies of the storage and delivery systems in the lower Colorado River, slips
through the cracks. It is slop, and from the perspective of consumptive water
users, it amounts to waste. Increasing demands for water, particularly in the
fast growing urban areas of southern California and Las Vegas, are increasing
the likelihood that efficiency improvements will be implemented in order to
devote conserved water to new uses. These collaborations, by depriving the
river environment of the “waste” water it now enjoys, pose additional threats to
efforts to restore the Colorado River Delta.
1. The Lining of the All-American Canal
Colorado River water is conveyed to California users, particularly in the
Imperial Irrigation District, primarily through the All-American Canal. The
canal diverts water near the border with Mexico and carries it westward. The
canal—whose mere proposal gave rise to the Colorado River Compact—was
authorized by Congress in 1928 and completed in 1942. It is an unlined canal
dug through permeable sand. As a result about two percent of the canal’s flow
seeps into the ground and migrates southwest to recharge the Mexicali Aquifer
underlying the Mexicali Valley in Mexico, where it supports groundwater supplied agriculture and wetland habitat considered part of the delta ecosystem.61
This is water that is not part of Mexico’s entitlement under the 1944 treaty, but
which supports both agriculture and the delta environment, including the
Andrade Mesa wetlands.
California water users have long recognized the potential to enhance the
amount of usable water available to them by conserving water seeping from the
All-American Canal. In 1988 Congress authorized the Bureau of Reclamation
to consider options for recovering water lost to canal seepage and using the
water to meet growing demands and to settle Indian water rights claims. The
Bureau proposed lining the canal in 1994, but the proposal lay dormant because
Congress required the project to be paid for by beneficiaries of the lining, not
the U.S. government. When pressure began to mount for California to reduce
its historic reliance on a greater draft of Colorado River water than its 4.4 maf
61

Osvel Hinojosa-Huerta et al., Andrade Mesa Wetlands of the All-American Canal, 42
NAT. RESOURCES J. 899, 900-01 (2002).
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SÉANCES, CIÉNEGAS, AND SLOP

8-AUG-08

12:08

865

entitlement, California water users forged an agreement with the Bureau to
finance the lining and allocate the water savings.62 The project will line
twenty-three miles of the canal with concrete and save more than 90,000 acrefeet of water annually. The bulk of the water saved (77,700 acre-feet per year)
will be allocated to San Diego for a period of 110 years.
U.S.-based environmentalists and a Mexican community group sued to
enjoin the project, alleging the failure to adequately consider environmental
impacts in Mexico and other statutory violations, but their suit was dismissed
as moot after a rider to an unrelated tax bill mandated that the project be carried
out “without delay” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”63
2. The Drop-2 Reservoir
Another proposal to improve the efficiency of water deliveries in the
lower Colorado River would deprive water directly from the river’s main stem.
The existing plumbing of the river requires the Bureau to release water from
Lake Mead and/or Parker Dam near Parker, AZ, in order to fulfill water orders
by downstream users, including farmers served by the All-American Canal and
its Coachella branch. About three days time is required for the river to move
the water from Parker Dam to Imperial Dam where it is diverted into the AllAmerican Canal, so farmers must place final orders for water at least three days
before they seek to apply it to their irrigated fields. Between the time of the
order and the actual delivery, however, unforeseen changes in circumstances—
such as weather conditions, evaporation rates, transpiration by vegetation,
unscheduled pumping from the river by floodplain farms, changes to water
orders, and variations of return flow—can result in water released from Parker
Dam not being needed or delivered for “beneficial use.”64
Because of very limited storage capability within the U.S. downstream of
Parker Dam, under usual operating conditions, water released at Parker Dam
but not used generally flows to Mexico and, if not consumptively used there, to
the delta. Such water is known as “non-storable” water. It is considered by
Colorado River water users to be undesirable waste because it generally cannot
be delivered to Mexico as part of scheduled deliveries under the 1944 treaty
and thus flows across the border without credit against Mexico’s 1.5 maf
allocation.
The construction of additional storage within the U.S. downstream of
Parker Dam would enhance the Bureau’s ability to ensure that any non-storable
water could be captured and later delivered to users to fulfill future water
orders. The Bureau has proposed construction of the Drop-2 Reservoir, an
8000 acre-foot reservoir just off the All-American Canal, to provide better regulation against loss of non-storable water. The proposed Drop-2 Reservoir
62

Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th
Cir. 2007).
63 Id. at 1167 (quoting section 395 of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922).
64 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LOWER COLORADO RIVER DROP
2 STORAGE RESERVOIR PROJECT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1-6 (2007), available
at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmental_docs/Drop_2/finalea/fea1.pdf.
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would enable the Bureau to conserve an average of 70,000 acre-feet annually
that flows uncredited to Mexico.
Nevada stands to be the primary beneficiary of the Drop-2 project. Under
a regime recently approved as part of the ongoing negotiations regarding management of the river during times of shortage, the Drop-2 would result in
“Intentionally Created Surplus” in the lower Colorado system. The preferred
alternative being considered by the Bureau would allow Colorado River water
contractors to bank ICS water in existing main stem facilities, effectively augmenting their allocation of water. To this end, the Southern Nevada Water
Authority has agreed to fund the Drop-2 project in return for sharing in the
bounty of the saved “slop.”
The loser of this collaboration, again, is the Colorado River Delta.
Because Mexico lacks storage facilities to capture the “non-storable” water
flowing across the border, much of the “slop” that will be prevented by the
Drop-2 project presently flows to the delta. As with the All-American Canal,
the ecological systems of the delta have developed a reliance on the accidental
“waste” of a system designed to serve consumptive uses. Eliminating the waste
will eliminate the accidental benefit to the delta.
III. PROSPECTS

IMPERATIVES FOR FUTURE COLLABORATIVE
RESTORATION OF THE DELTA

AND

Standing alone, the history of collaboration on the Colorado River, as it
relates to the problems of the delta, could lead one to the conclusion that collaboration offers no hope. But that conclusion would be too hasty. After all,
until fairly recently, the ecological values of the delta were not a significant
concern of the major players in bargained agreements over Colorado River
water, and the legal regimes against which those negotiations took place did
nothing to elevate the delta’s importance. To say that the collaborations led to
the delta’s decline because the process of decisionmaking was collaborative
rather than legalistic or formally adversarial goes too far. Indeed, supporters of
collaborative governance would likely point out that the framework collaborations led to harmful impacts on the delta because they were not properly structured to address the delta and its ecosystem. Had the collaborations included
environmental stakeholders and focused all stakeholders’ attention on the goal
of minimizing harm to the delta, such supporters might argue, perhaps the
result of the collaborations would not be so dire.
That might be true, but a conclusion that the process of decisionmaking on
the Colorado River to some extent predetermined harm to the delta still cannot
be dismissed. Anthropologist Laura Nader, reviewing nations’ choice of negotiation over adjudication in international water disputes (including the Colorado
River), concludes that powerful nations historically have preferred the mode of
negotiation while weaker states favor adjudication.65 The reason, she concludes, is that “without the possibility of third-party decision-makers, the more
powerful disputant can use ADR negotiation to greater advantage” because
65

Laura Nader, Civilization and Its Negotiations, in UNDERSTANDING DISPUTES: THE
POLITICS OF ARGUMENT 39, 50-60 (Pat Caplan ed., 1995) (reviewing disputes on the Colorado, Danube, Jordan, Ganges, and Duero/Douro Rivers and Lake Lanoux).
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power dynamics, rather than principles of justice or rule of law, determine the
outcomes of disputes.66 Nader’s work suggests that, even had there been
adjudicable legal principles favoring the delta’s protection (at the cost of
upstream uses within the United States), such ends were prejudiced by the
choice of a dispute resolution mechanism likely to mirror existing power relationships. In other words, water users in the powerful United States would
ensure their entitlement all the more easily through negotiation than through
adjudication. That such legal principles were not firmly in place during the
framework adjudications served only to further weaken Mexico’s ability to
secure enough water to protect the delta.
In light of this mottled past experience with collaboration, it might be
profitable to consider the possibilities for future Colorado River collaborative
efforts meaningfully to address the issues of the delta.
A. Restructuring the Legal and Economic Framework of the Colorado
River
If the future of the Colorado River Delta could be written on a tabula rasa,
wiped clean of the residue of history and existing legal frameworks, then perhaps the plight of the delta could be easily remedied. By changing the overall
legal and economic framework of the river, water could be directed to the delta
by force of the law, the market, or some combination of the two. It is certainly
possible to imagine a radical change to the existing regime that would force the
abandonment of the present law of the river and its replacement by some new
regime more attuned to the conditions prevailing today, whether they be natural—such as climate change—or political and economic—such as the increasing population along the lower Colorado River or the rise in the twentieth
century of environmental values.
In a separate article in this Symposium, Bradley Karkkainen theorizes that
such a radical reformation of the existing regime might happen.67 Drawing on
the work of Professors Simon and Sable on destabilization rights in institutional
reform, Professor Karkkainen argues that legal or natural events might lead
stakeholders on the river to conclude it would be preferable to craft wholesale a
new collaborative arrangement than to rely on the existing framework to
address unforeseen circumstances. Most probable among the catalysts, it
seems, would be global climate change, which is likely to stress the river’s
supply on the one hand, and continued population growth in the southwestern
United States and northwestern Mexico, which will increase demand for water
resources for urban use.
Such a destabilization catalyst to collaboration seems possible, even if
events to date have led only to tinkering with the existing legal regime. No
stakeholders, at least within the United States, yet seem willing to cede any
vested rights under the existing regime.68 But even if the theory plays out as
66

Id. at 50 (citing John G. Laylin & Rinaldo L. Bianchi, The Rôle of Adjudication in International River Disputes: The Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 30, 49 (1959)).
67 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations and
the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811 (2008).
68 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 3, at 971-73 (discussing the trade-offs in the seven states’
agreement on shortage).
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Karkkainen envisions, the theory is only good as far as it goes, and it does not
go all the way to the delta. Even if the existing legal regime becomes destabilized, making room for a collaborative effort to fill its void, the likelihood of
the ascension of environmental values in such an effort seems limited. Legal
norms, both international and domestic, have shifted since the framework
agreements cemented for the Colorado River utilitarian principles, as evidenced
by the decline of the Harmon Doctrine and the rise of the United Nations Convention on the Uses of International Watercourses.69 Still, it seems more likely
that any regime that rises from the ashes of the destabilized law of the river will
be shaped by powerful economic interests seeking to enhance or protect their
share of an increasingly scarce resource more than by environmental values or
concern for the delta.
B. Adjusting Domestic Law
A second, less dramatic way in which the potential for future collaborations to aid the delta’s recovery might be enhanced is by strengthening the
hands of the environmental advocates who champion the delta’s cause. This
might be accomplished by amending domestic law on one or both sides of the
border to provide for enforceable obligations to promote the recovery of the
delta, to prevent its further decline, or even to study and consider the impacts of
proposed changes to the physical system on the delta’s ecosystem. The lesson
of the LCRMSCP is particularly instructive. Having failed in the collaborative
process to secure consideration of habitat values in the delta, environmental
advocates resorted to the adjudicative alternative, a federal lawsuit. However,
the limits of enforceable United States law, namely the ESA as applied in this
particular international context, depressed the value of this alternative. As Professor Nader has suggested, if rights may be adjudicated, there is less a chance
that the collaboration or negotiation taken as an alternative will merely reflect
the raw power of the parties.70 If environmental interests have some hard law
mechanisms to employ through good, old-fashioned environmental enforcement efforts, then they will likely get more of what they need in collaborative
processes.
As with Karkkainen’s destabilization theory, this sounds good so far as it
goes. But the likelihood of legislative or administrative adjustments to United
States environmental law to embolden environmental advocates is uncertain at
best. It is further uncertain whether any amendments would actually result in a
collaborative solution. Emboldened environmental interests might well take
their chances in adjudication.
C. Tweaking the “Law of the River”
A third, and probably the most probable, possibility for a successful collaborative approach to restoring the delta would be more minimal. The existing
law of the river could be tweaked to enable environmental stakeholders and
Mexico to participate in mechanisms intended to provide water users flexibility
69

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M 700.
70 See Nader, supra note 65, at 50.
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to meet their changing needs with the existing physical and legal structures. In
particular, as several environmental advocates have suggested,71 the recentlyadopted Intentionally Created Surplus framework could be extended to permit
cross-border participation.
As detailed in Professor Grant’s paper in this Symposium,72 the ICS provisions of the shortage criteria are designed to allow water contractors to obtain
more water by implementing or funding water conservation measures. ICS, in
a sense, is a collaborative, market-based mechanism, designed to enable stakeholders within the Colorado River basin to obtain more water without harming
other water users. It does this by eliminating impediments the law of the river
presented to implementing conservation, augmentation, and water exchanges
successfully. The most important way it promotes these mechanisms is by
allowing “surplus” water created by conservation, augmentation, or exchange
to be stored in existing Colorado River reservoirs for later use by the entity that
created (or paid for) the surplus. The Drop-2 Dam project discussed above, for
example, will allow the Southern Nevada Water Authority to pay for efficiency
improvements in California and to reap the benefit of the water conserved.
Similarly, entities that pay to fallow agricultural lands within a state will enjoy
the benefit of the conserved water. The likely effect of ICS is that it will ease
the way for agricultural to urban water transfers.
If water is to be found to replenish the delta, it is most likely to come from
existing, low productivity agricultural lands either within Mexico or in the
United States because that water has relatively low value in its present use, or
from efficiency improvements within Mexico, including canal lining and other
measures.73 Extending the ICS system across the border will greatly improve
the chances for such transfers. As noted above, there is no water storage capacity within Mexico. Any water conserved by efficiency projects or removing
poor quality agricultural land from production cannot be used for any purpose
other than feeding the delta because it cannot be stored after its delivery to
Mexico. Water conserved by fallowing low productivity Mexican agricultural
lands must be used within Mexico during the same year according to the delivery schedule under the 1944 treaty, or else it will flow unused to the delta.
Allowing Mexican participation in ICS, however, could provide Mexican water
users a virtual storage capacity that would break the rigidity of the annual
delivery schedule under the 1944 treaty. Under an analogous system to ICS,
water conserved from improvements in Mexico could be stored in Lake Mead
or some other reservoir for delivery in a later year. Importantly, this would
enable Mexican system improvements to contribute toward the 260,000 acrefeet pulse flows required every four years for the delta’s restoration.

71

See Taking ICS to Mexico: International Opportunities in the Seven States Agreement
(July 7, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/alternatives/
CBS2B.pdf (Appendix B to the Conservation Before Shortage II Proposal by Defenders of
Wildlife, Environmental Defense, National Wildlife Federation, The Nature Conservancy,
Pacific Institute, Sierra Club, and Sonoran Institute).
72 Grant, supra note 3, at 975-79.
73 Glennon & Culp, supra note 5, at 967-68.
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The states have indicated a willingness to consider at least some aspects of
the proposal.74 Doing so would enhance the possibility that adequate water for
the delta could be obtained by water transfers from less productive agricultural
uses in Mexico and possibly the U.S.
D. Keeping a Lid on Optimism
In conclusion, lest optimism runs amok that collaboration will reverse the
delta’s long decline, the delta remains poorly understood. The “one percent”
solution pressed by environmental advocates is directed solely toward restoring
riparian habitat in the delta region; it does not address other aspects of the
ecosystem under strain, notably the upper Gulf. Fully adequate restoration of
the entire delta ecosystem might require more water than is presently envisioned, but only further research will enlighten us. Collaborative research to
gain a better understanding of the delta ecosystem is required to know whether
future decisions bring the delta closer to life or death.

74

Letter from the States of Ariz., Cal., Colo., Nev., N.M., Utah, and Wyo. Governors’
Representatives on Colo. River Operations to Sec’y of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne 3-4
(Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStates.pdf (“The Basin States support the concept of Mexico participating
in the ICS program at some time in the future, provided that its participation is addressed in
the context of other river operation matters and is part of a comprehensive arrangement
between the two nations that incorporates, at a minimum, the material terms of the Basin
States’ Proposal. The Basin States stand ready to discuss this comprehensive
arrangement.”).

